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7.1 Introduction
For a number ofyears, government at the federal, state, and local levels and
various private groups have engaged in a campaign to discourage alcohol and
illicit drug use. These efforts have been motivated by an increasing awareness
of the consequences of alcohol and drug abuse. Alcohol and drug abuse im-
poses significant costs on society and on the individual users. These costs in-
clude alcohol- and drug-related health problems, employment problems, and
crime. Health costs from alcohol and drug abuse are the result of fatal and
nonfatal accidents, especially on the highway and at work, liver cirrhosis, heart
disease, various cancers, and accidental overdoses. In addition, there are costs
due to poor birth outcomes and the physical and emotional damage caused to
children by alcohol and drug abusing parents. Employment costs from alcohol
and drug abuse are lost income due to reduced prOductivity, increased unem-
ployment and absenteeism, and changes in career choice. Crime costs from
alcohol and drug abuse are due to psychological effects on users; the need to
generate income to buy drugs and, to a lesserextent, alcohol; and the extralegal
nature ofillicit drug transactions.
Although the antialcohol and antidrug campaigns have producedresults, sig-
nificant problems remain. One part ofthe campaign has been the introduction
or strengthening ofpolicies thatdirectly orindirectly increase the costs ofalco-
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hoI and drug abuse. Policies that increase the cost ofalcohol abuse include in-
creases in alcohol taxes and increased sanctions against drunk driving. Policies
that are intended to increase the cost ofdrugs include interdiction ofdrug ship-
ments, eradication ofdrug crops in the field, and drug-related criminal justice
efforts. The assumption is that these policies increase the price ofalcohol and
drugs and thus reduce use ofthese substances. One shortcoming ofthese cam-
paigns has been the lack ofemphasis on potential demographic differences in
the response to public policies. If one or more demographic groups are rela-
tively unresponsive to price, then alternative policies might be appropriate. Es-
timation ofthe effect ofprice, by demographic group, would be helpful in de-
signing the mix of strategies that will be most successful in reducing overall
alcohol and drug abuse.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate, for specific demographic groups,
differentials in use and participation, and differentials in the effects ofalcohol
and drug prices and cross prices on alcohol and drug use. There are few prior
empirical studies of this nature because of insufficient data. This paper em-
ploys a data set of over 49,000 individuals derived from the National House-
hold Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) that has been augmented with alcohol
and drug price data. Two novel features of this paper are the estimation of
drug- and demographic-specific demand curves with drug price data, and the
estimation of alcohol price effects with county-level alcohol prices and data
from the NHSDA. The results for eight specific demographic groups are pre-
sented in this paper. Estimation by specific demographic group allows for dem-
ographic-specific effects of all of the included variables without the need to
include potentially problematic sets ofinteraction terms. It is also important to
test for cross-price effects since these effects may enhance ordilute the effects
of price policies. If a pair of substances are substitutes, then increasing the
price ofone will induce more use of the other substance. Alternatively, ifthe
substances are complements, then an increase in the price of one will reduce
use of both. Estimates of alcohol and drug price and cross-price effects by
demographic group are important since demographic groups may respond dif-
ferently to alcohol and drug control policies.
7.2 Prior Studies
The empirical literature on the effects of alcohol prices is considerably
larger than the empirical literature on the effects ofdrug prices. This difference
is due to the greater availability ofalcohol price data. These alcohol and drug
studies generally include a number of demographic measures as independent
variables, which provides some insight into demographic differentials in drug
and alcohol use. A few studies specifically examine cross-price effects be-
tween alcohol and marijuana, and a few studies specifically estimate the effects
ofprice on alcohol and drug use with data sets limited to youth or women.189 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
7.2.1 Alcohol Studies
The empirical literature provides considerable evidence that shows that in-
creasing the price of alcoholic beverages decreases alcohol use. Leung and
Phelps (1993) review 21 of these studies. Alcohol demand studies generally
estimate price elasticities for beer, wine, and spirits separately. Most studies
employ aggregate data but a few use individual data. Studies using aggregate
data find price elasticities for beer from about -.2 to about -1.0, for wine
from about -.3 to about -1.8, and for spirits from about -.3 to about -1.8.
Studies using individual data estimate price elasticities for beer from about
-.5 to about - 3.0, for wine at about -.5, and for spirits from about -.5 to
about -4.0. A study by Kendell, de Roumanie, and Ritson (1983) estimates
price elasticities of total alcohol for men at -1.95 and for women at -2.19.
Also, a study by Grossman, Coate, and Arluck (1987) estimates beer price
elasticities for youth at - 3.05 and spirits price elasticities for youth at - 3.83.
Kenkel (1993) estimates alcohol price elasticities for men at - .48 and for
women at -1.07. It appears that women and youth may have somewhat more
elastic alcohol demand than the population in general.
Two alcohol studies with individual data also include a number of right-
hand-side demographic variables. Heien and Pompelli (1989) find that being
black increases beer and spirits consumption but decreases wine consumption,
and being single increases alcohol consumption. Kenkel (1993) finds that be-
ing black, Hispanic, married, or a divorced woman has a negative effect on
heavy drinking. Kenkel finds that being a divorced male increases heavy
drinking.
7.2.2 Drug Studies
There are a few prior empirical studies ofthe effects ofdrug prices on drug
use. There are no studies that use marijuana price, butthere are several that use
marijuana decriminalization as a measure offull price. Saffer and Chaloupka
(forthcoming) examine the effects of marijuana decriminalization, heroin
prices, and cocaine prices on the use of these three drugs, respectively. They
find that marijuana decriminalization increases the probability of marijuana
participation by about 4 to 6 percent. The price elasticity for heroin is esti-
mated at about -1.80 to -1.60, and for cocaine at about -1.10 to -.72. A
study by van Ours (1995) Uses data on opium in Indonesia during the Dutch
colonial period. He finds a price elasticity of -.7 to -1.0 for use and of -.3
to -.4 for participation. DiNardo (1993) studies the effect ofprice on cocaine
use by high school seniors. He uses a state-aggregated version ofthe Monitor-
ing the Future (MTF) data set with drug prices from the Drug Enforcement
Agency. He finds no effect ofprice on cocaine use. A study by Silverman and
Spruill (1977) uses a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set on 41 Detroit
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ticity for heroin use in Detroit of about - .26. Silverman and Spruill (1977)
also find that property crime rates are positively and significantly affected by
the price of heroin, while nonproperty crime rates are not. Brown and Sil-
verman (1980) use a time series on various crime rates in New York City to
look at the impact ofheroin prices on crime rates. They find that reductions in
the price ofheroin lead to a fall in property crimes but that prices have no im-
pact on other crimes. The results from the crime studies suggest an inelastic
demand for heroin. Nisbet and Vakil (1972) use data collected from interviews
with UCLA students to estimate the demand for marijuana. They estimate the
price elasticity ofmarijuana at -.7 to -1.0.
There are a few additional studies that focus on the effect ofmarijuana de-
criminalization on marijuana participation. Marijuana decriminalization is a
law that reduces the penalties for possession ofa small amount ofmarijuana.
Marijuana decriminalization thus has the effect of reducing the full price of
marijuana use. Pacula (1994) used the National Longitudinal Survey ofYouth
(NLSY) to study the relationship between marijuana and alcohol. She included
a variable measuring decriminalization but found no effect on marijuana use.
Thies and Register (1993) studied the effect ofmarijuana decriminalization on
use. They also used the NLSY and also concluded that decriminalization had
no effect on use. DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) studied the relationship be-
tween marijuana and alcohol. They used the MTF surveys and included a var-
iable measuring marijuana decriminalization. They too found that decrimi-
nalization had no effect on marijuana participation. Johnston, O'Malley, and
Bachman (1981) studied the effect of marijuana decriminalization using the
MTF surveys of high school seniors. They concluded that decriminalization
had no effect on marijuana use. All of these studies are based on samples of
young people, whose behavior may not be representative ofthe overall popu-
lation.
Model (1992) studied the effect of marijuana decriminalization on crime
rates using state-aggregate data from the Uniform Crime Reports. She found
that decriminalization had a significant positive effect on property crimes and
a significant negative effect on violent crimes. Model (1993) also studied the
effect of decriminalization on hospital emergency room drug episodes. She
used data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network and found that decriminal-
ization increased marijuana-related emergency room visits but decreased all
other emergency room visits.
Several drug studies include demographic variables as independent vari-
abIes. Sickles and Taubman (1991) find that blacks, Hispanics, and men are
more likely to consume illegal drugs. They also find that age, education, and
religious participation have a negative effect on illicit drug use. However, Di-
Nardo and Lemieux (1992) and Pacula (1994) find that minorities consume
less or the same levels of illegal drugs as whites. Thies and Register (1993)
find that marriage has a negative effect on drug use.191 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
7.2.3 Studies with Cross-Price Effects between Alcohol and Illicit Drugs
A summary ofthe biomedical literature in NIAAA (1993) suggests that al-
cohol use and illicit drug use may be mutually reinforcing. That is, the use of
two drugs taken together produces an effect greater than the sum ofthe effects
ofeach drug taken individually. This suggests complementarity in the class of
demand curves that assume a constant marginal utility of income. There are
four econometric studies ofcross-price effects between alcohol and marijuana
for youth. Three of these studies find some evidence of substitution and the
other finds evidence ofcomplementarity.
DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) studied the relationship between marijuana
and alcohol with the MTF surveys. They included variables for marijuana de-
criminalization, the drinking age, and alcohol price. They found that decrimi-
nalization had a significant negative effect on alcohol participation, although
it had no effect on marijuana participation. They also found that the drinking
age had a significant positive effect on marijuana participation and a negative
effect on alcohol participation. Finally, they found that the price ofalcohol had
no effect on marijuana participation and no effect on alcohol participation.
The cross-price effects suggest substitution between alcohol and marijuana for
youth. This evidence would be more compelling ifthere were more significant
own-price effects.
Thies and Register (1993) studied the effect ofmarijuana decriminalization
on marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine participation using the NLSY. They found
that decriminalization had a positive effect on alcohol and cocaine partici-
pation, no effect on heavy alcohol participation, and no effect on marijuana
participation. This suggests that alcohol and cocaine are complements with
marijuana. Again, this evidence would be more compelling ifthere were more
significant own-price effects.
Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1994) used the 1982 and 1989 MTF surveys to
study the relationship between alcohol and marijuana. They included variables
measuring marijuana price, decriminalization, and beer taxes. They found that
drinking participation and heavy drinking are positively related to the price of
marijuana, negatively related to decriminalization, and negatively related to
beer taxes. These results suggest that alcohol and marijuana are substitutes.
Pacula (1994) used the NLSY to study the relationship between marijuana
and alcohol. She included variables measuring decriminalization, beer taxes,
and legal drinking age. She found that beer taxes reduced marijuana participa-
tion and alcohol participation. She also found that decriminalization reduced
alcohol participation but had no effect on marijuana participation. The legal
drinking age was never significant. This evidence suggests that alcohol and
marijuana are substitutes.192 Henry Saffer and FrankJ. Chaloupka
7.3 Data Set
7.3.1 Introduction
The empirical models estimated in this paper are demand curves. The basis
of these empirical demand curves is the same theoretical demand model that
is used for other goods. Theoretical drug demand curves are derived in the
usual fashion by maximizing individual utility subject to a budget constraint
consisting of the full price, other prices, and income. The derived demand
curves show that drug consumption is negatively related to the full price and
related, without a priori sign, to income and taste. The data used to estimate
these demand curves come from a pool ofthe 1988, 1990, and 1991 National
Household Surveys on Drug Abuse (NHSDA).l The pooled data set consists
of 49,802 observations, which allows for selection of relatively large demo-
graphic specific samples. County-level alcohol prices, state-level marijuanade-
criminalization laws, and state-level drug prices have been appended to the in-
dividual records.2
In addition to the full sample, seven demographic-specific samples were se-
lected from the pooled NHSDA data set. The seven groups are (1) white male
non-Hispanic, (2) black, (3) Asian, (4) NativeAmerican, (5) women, (6) youth,
and (7) Hispanic. The survey defines individuals as identified with one offour
mutually exclusive and exhaustive race categories. These race groups are
(1) white, (2) black, (3) Asian or Pacific Islander, and (4) Native American or
Alaskan Native. The survey also defines people as Hispanic or non-Hispanic,
with the four following categories of Hispanic included: (1) Puerto Rican,
(2) Mexican, (3) Cuban, and (4) other Hispanic.3 The white male non-Hispanic
group was selected as a group to use for comparison with other groups. The
regressions using the black, Native American, and Asian samples include a
Hispanic variable to control for possible differences due to Hispanic ethnicity.
The regressions for women and youth include variables for race and Hispanic
ethnicity. The Hispanic regressions include variables for Cuban, Puerto Rican,
and Mexican, with the "other Hispanic" as the omitted category. For ease of
comparisons with other data sets regressions based on all the data are also
presented. These regressions include variables for black, Asian, Native Ameri-
1. The 1988, 1990, and 1991 surveys are very similar except for size. The 1991 survey is over
three times as large as the 1988 and 1990 surveys. The 1991 survey is larger, in part, because six
primary sampling units (PSUs) were oversampled. Each survey also oversamples persons aged
12-17, Hispanics, and African Americans.
2. We are indebted to the Office ofApplied Studies, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Ser-
vices Administration, for merging the county- and state-level data to the individual records in the
NHSDA. With the exception ofone PSU in 1990 and six PSUs in 1991, no locational identifiers
are available due to confidentiality issues.
3. An individual can be in anyone of the four racial groups and also be Hispanic or non-
Hispanic.193 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
Table 7.1 Weighted Average Means from the National Household Surveys of
Drug Abuse




















Number ofdays alcohol was used in the past 31 days. m = 3.49
Dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a respondent reports using
marijuana in the past year. m = .071
Dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a respondent reports using
cocaine in the past year. m = .019
Dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a respondent reports using
heroin in the past year. m = .001
The price ofa liter ofpure alcohol in 1983 dollars. m = $24.78
A dichotomous indicator equal to 1 for states that have eliminated
incarceration as a penalty for most marijuanapossession offenses.
m = .303
Price of 1 pure gram ofcocaine in 1983 dollars. m = $111.47
Price of 1 pure milligram ofheroin in 1983 dollars. m = $6.48
Total personal income in 1983 dollars. m = $11,781
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 for males. m = .479
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifmarried. m = .569
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if marital status was missing is
also included. m = .033
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual is 12-20years of
age. m = .155
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Asian. m = .019
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Native American. m = .024
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is black. m = .151
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Hispanic. m = .078
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Puerto Rican. m = .019
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Mexican. m = .084
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 ifan individual self-reports that
he or she is Cuban. m = .007
Note: Final sample size when missing values were excluded is 49,802.
can, women, youth, and Hispanic. A summary of the variable definitions and
means are included in table 7.1. The means presented in this table are weighted
so that they are comparable to a random sample ofthe United States.
4
4. The data are weighted using the analysis weight variable in each survey. The individual data
is multiplied by the weight variable and then divided by the sum ofthe weight variable. The means
for combined data are computed as a weighted average of weighted means for the three surveys.
The weights are defined as the sample size divided by the total size ofthe three samples.194 Henry Saffer and Frank J. Chaloupka
7.3.2 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this study are a continuous measure of alcohol
use anddichotomous measures ofmarijuana, cocaine, and heroin participation.
The alcohol participation variable measures the number ofdays in the past 30
days that the individual had consumed alcohol. The drug participation vari-
abIes are equal to one ifthe individual reports that he or she used the substance
during the past year.
There are two measurement concerns with the use and participation data.
The NHSDA includes only individuals with a fixed residence. The survey ex-
cludes the 2 percent ofthe population who live in institutional group quarters
or who have no fixed residence. Alcohol and drug use and prevalence in the
excluded groups, especially prisoners and the homeless, may be different than
for the remainder ofthe population. If the effect ofprice and other variables
on use and prevalence differs between included and excluded individuals, then
no inference can be made with regard to the effect ofpolicy on the excluded
group. However, the estimated coefficients would still reflect the effect ofpol-
icy on use and prevalence for the included group. The second problem with
reported use and participation in the NHSDA is underreporting because ofthe
stigma associated with high levels of alcohol use and the stigma and legal
issues associated with drug use. Ifstigma is positively related to use, then un-
derreporting will be more of a problem in use data than in participation data.
Underreporting would have no effect on the coefficients of linear regression
specifications if the underreporting is unrelated to use, although the t-values
wouldbebiaseddownwardandtheelasticitieswouldbebiasedupward. Ifunder-
reporting is systematically related to use, then no conclusion can be reached
with regard to the effect ofthe underreporting bias.
7.3.3 Price Data
The price ofalcohol consists ofthe prices ofbeer, wine, and distilled spirits.
Data on the prices come from the American Chamber ofCommerce Research
Association's (ACCRA's) quarterly Inter-City CostofLivingIndex (1988, 1990,
1991). This index contains prices, inclusive of taxes, for over 250 cities each
quarter, and was used to construct county-level prices. This data was merged
with the NHSDA on a PSU level.5 A single alcohol price variable, the price of
one pure liter of alcohol, was created from the beer, wine, and spirits prices.
This computation was done by first computing the price perliter for each bev-
erage. The price ofbeer is reported for a six-pack. The price was divided by
2.13, which is the number of liters in a six-pack. Since the price of wine is
reported for a 1.5 liter bottle, the wine price was divided by this number. Spirits
prices are reported for a 1.0 liter bottle. Next, these liter prices were divided
5. There was no ACCRA data available for Washington, D.C., so an average price from urban
Virginia and urban Maryland was used.195 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
by the proportion of alcohol in each beverage (.04 for beer, .11 for wine, and
.41 for spirits). A weighted average price ofpure alcohol can now be computed.
The weights are the share of pure alcohol consumption represented by each
beverage. These weights are .569 for beer, .113 for wine, and .318 for spirits.
These weight datacome from the Brewer'sAssociation ofCanadaInternational
Survey. Prices were adjusted to their real value in 1982-84 dollars.
Prices for cocaine and heroin come from the u.S. Department of Justice,
Drug Enforcement Agency's STRIDE data set.
6 Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration agents and police narcotics officers purchase illicit drugs regularly. The
price, purity, weight, and other information are recorded in the STRIDE data
set. One reason these price data are collected is so that DEA agents will know
how much to offer when negotiating to buy from drug dealers. The price data
are fairly accurate since inaccurate data would endanger these agents. The
STRIDE data set provided by the DEA to the National Bureau of Economic
Research contains cocaine and heroin data from 1977 through 1988 and 1991
for approximately 144 cities or towns. This data set has over 23,000 cocaine
price observations and over 15,000 heroin price observations.
The procedure described in more detail in Saffer and Chaloupka (forthcom-
ing) was followed to estimate heroin and cocaine prices. Briefly, to estimate
drug prices the log of purity was regressed on log of weight, city dummies,
and time dummies. This regression was used to project an estimated purity
variable for all observations. Next, the log ofprice was regressed on the log of
the weight times the estimated purity, city dummies, and time dummies.? This
regression was performed by entering log weight and log estimated purity as
separate variables and constraining their coefficients to be identical. Setting
weight at 1 unit and purity at 100 percent makes the log ofthese values zero.
The estimated coefficients of the city dummies and time dummies were then
used to predict a price for every city-time combination. The projected price is
the price of 1 unit of 100 percent pure drug. The antilog was then computed
and the local level prices were aggregated to the state level. This aggregation
was computed as a weighted average of all the represented cities in the state.
The population weights for each city were computedby dividing the city popu-
lation by the total population ofall represented cities in the state. The popula-
tion data come from the City and County Databook (U.S. Department ofCom-
merce 1993).
There are two issues regarding the price data that are important. The first
issue is the exogeneity ofprice. Alcohol prices vary because oftaxes, transpor-
6. There are price data for marijuana from the Drug Enforcement Agency's Domestic Cities
Report. These prices are for retail and wholesale commercial-grade marijuana for 19 cities in 16
states. Use ofthis data required a significant reduction in the number ofobservations used in the
analysis. A number of alternative estimates of the price of marijuana were made with this data.
The resulting price variables were inconsistent with all other price data in the data set and resulted
in unstable coefficients when used in a series ofalternative demand specifications. For these rea-
sons, these marijuana price data were not used.
7. This is a reduced-form price equation from a supply and demand model. The city and time
dummies are proxies for unobserved city- and time-specific factors.196 Henry Saffer and FrankJ. Chaloupka
tation costs, and local cost conditions. These variables are independentoflocal
alcohol demand variations, making the price of alcohol exogenous. If drug
supply is not horizontal, then price and quantity would be endogenous. How-
ever, since the predicted price variable used in the regressions comes from a
reduced form model, it is uncorrelated with the error term in the demand equa-
tion. The second issue is measurement error. Merging individual-level drug
use data with state-level drug prices introduces a potential for measurement
error due to matching. Any measurement error created by the matching prob-
lem is probably small, since in each state, most drug users are in the larger ur-
ban areas and, for each state, the drug price data comes mostly from the larger
urban areas. Ifthere is any matching measurement error in the price data, but
it is uncorrelated with the included regressors and the equation error term, then
no bias will be introduced.
The full price of marijuana is, in part, reflected by the decriminalization
law. This law specifically eliminates criminal sanctions for possession ofsmall
amounts ofmarijuana. Decriminalization ofmarijuana eliminates possible im-
prisonment for most first-offense possession violations. Oregon, in 1973, was
the first state to decriminalize marijuana. By 1978, 10 other states had fol-
lowed, substantially reducing the penalties associated with marijuana posses-
sion. Decriminalization, by lowering the penalties associated with marijuana
use, is expected to increase marijuana demand.
7.3.4 Other Independent Variables
Total personal income is defined as income from all sources, including
wages, self-employment, social security, public assistance, child support, and
otherpension income. Income is a continuous variable measured in dollars and
has been adjusted to its real value in 1982-83 dollars. Ifalcohol and drugs are
normal goods, increased income will lead to increased consumption. However,
since health is a normal good, increased income may reduce the consumption
of alcohol and drugs. The net effect of an increase in income on demand is,
thus, without a priori prediction.
A group of dichotomous demographic variables is also included in certain
regressions. These are age, race, ethnicity, gender, and marital status. A youth
variable has been defined as equal to 1 ifthe individual is between 12 and 20
years old. Three dichotomous race variables are defined: black, Asian, and Na-
tive American. These variables are equal to 1 ifthe individual reports that he
or she belongs to the respective race group. Similar variables were defined for
Hispanics, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, gender (1 ifmale), and marriage
(1 ifmarried). Since there are a number ofmissing values for marital status, a
second variable was defined equal to 1 if the marital status data are missing,
with the missing data on marital status recoded to zero.
7.3.5 Consumer Price Index
The alcohol price and income are defined in real terms using a price index
that reflects both county-level prices for each year and national-level prices197 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
over time. Since drug prices are state level, they are adjusted only with the
national-level price index.8 The county price index comes from the ACCRA.
The ACCRA reports a cost-of-living index for over 250 cities and towns in the
United States. TheACCRA cost-of-living index is based on over 60 categories
of consumer purchases and uses expenditure weights based on government
survey data ofexpenditures ofmidmanagementhouseholds. TheACCRAcost-
of-living index has no time variation. The national-level CPI comes from the
U.S. Department ofCommerce and uses 1982-84 as the base year.
7.4 Regression Results
Tables 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 present the estimation results for alcohol, mari-
juana, cocaine, and heroin participation, respectively. The alcohol models are
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS), and the drug participation models
are estimated as dichotomous probits.9 Each of these four tables presents the
results for eight demographic groups. The demographic groups are (1) the full
sample, (2) white male non-Hispanics, (3) blacks, (4) Native Americans, (5)
Asians, (6) Hispanics, (7) women, and (8) youth. All regressions include price
(or decriminalization for marijuana), income, marital status, and time dum-
mies. Other demographic variables are included when appropriate. Tables 7.2
through 7.5 also include, by demographic group, the number ofobservations,
the price elasticity, and the weighted average participation.10Table 7.2 and table
7.3 also include a weighted average measure of use by demographic group.
Table 7.6 presents the results from 96 additional regressions. The 96 regres-
sions resulted from the reestimation of each of the regressions in tables 7.2
through 7.5, three additional times, with one additional price added.
ll The pur-
pose ofthese regressions is to search for evidence ofcomplementarity, substi-
tutability, or independence ofalcohol and drugs. Since there are 96 additional
two-price specifications, only the cross-price effects from these specifications
are presented in table 7.6.
8. A state-level CPI could be computed, but it would introduce a measurement error due to
matching individuals living in different-sized communities in a state with the same CPI. Rather
than introduce this measurement error, a state-level adjustment is omitted.
9. There is data on the number ofdays that marijuana was used in the past month. This data is
not appropriate to use with OLS since it is 95.5 percent zeros. The alternative data is dichotomous
annual use. This data is appropriate to use with probit estimation.
10. The alcohol elasticities are defined as the percentage change in number of days used with
respect to a percentage change in the price. The cocaine and heroin elasticities are percentage
change in the probability ofparticipation with respect to a percentage change in price. The cocaine
and heroin price elasticities were estimated by multiplying the normal density function of the
estimated equation by the price variable coefficient and then by the ratio ofthe mean price to mean
participation. The unweighted means were used in these computations rather than the weighted
means, which are reported in table 7.1. The unweighted means were used since the estimated
regression coefficients are based on unweighted data.
11. The inclusion of an additional price variable increases colinearity problems. Each of the
regressions in tables 7.2 through 7.5 were also reestimated with three additional prices added.
While the results from this exercise are similar to those presented in table 7.6, the colinearity
introduced by three additional price variables makes this approach more questionable than the
inclusion ofjust a single additional price variable.198 Henry Saffer and FrankJ. Chaloupka
Table 7.2presents the alcohol results for the eight demographic groups listed
above. Participation and use are lower than in the full sample for blacks, Native
Americans, Asians, Hispanics, women, and youth. For Native Americans that
participate, use is higher than the full sample. Both participation and use are
higher than the full sample for white male non-Hispanics. The regression coef-
ficients are negative and significantfor black, Asian, Hispanic, and youth. Gen-
der is positive and significant, indicating that women consume less. Marital
status is negative, indicating that married people consume less. The Native
American variable is always insignificant. The Puerto Rican and Mexican vari-
ables are positive, indicating that these groups consume more than other His-
panics. The price variable is negative and significant for the full sample, white
male non-Hispanics, blacks, and women. Priceis insignificantfor NativeAmer-
icans, Asians, and youth, and positive and significant for Hispanics. The own-
participation price elasticities were estimated for the fOUf negative and signifi-
cant price coefficients. The price elasticity did not vary significantly across the
four demographic groups. The effect ofincome on alcohol is also very consis-
tent across demographic groups. Income has a positive and significant effect
on use for all groups except blacks.
Table 7.3 presents the marijuana results for the eight demographic groups.
Participation and use are lower than in the full sample for Native Americans,
Asians, Hispanics, and women. Blacks have about the same participation and
use as the full sample, and white male non-Hispanics have higher participation
and use than the full sample. Youth have higher participation but lower use
than the full sample. The regression coefficients are negative and significant
for blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. Genderis positive and significant, indicating
that women consume less. Marital status is negative, indicating that married
people consume less. The Native American variable is insignificant three of
four times. The youth variable is mixed. The Puerto Rican and Mexican vari-
ables are positive, indicating that these groups consume more than other His-
panics. The decriminalization variable is positive and significant in seven out
ofeight specifications (the only exception was for Native Americans). The ef-
fect ofthe decriminalization variable was estimated by calculating the differ-
ence between the value ofthe distribution function using all ofthe coefficients
and mean values and the value of the distribution function with the decrimi-
nalization variable set to zero. The magnitude of the decriminalization effect
across demographic groups was somewhat lower for blacks than for the full
sample and higher for Asians than for the full sample. The effects of income
on marijuana participation varies considerably by demographic group. Income
has a positive effect on participation for youth and Hispanics, a negative effect
on participation for white male non-Hispanics and blacks, and no effect on
participation for NativeAmericans, Asians, and women and for the full sample.
Table 7.4 presents the cocaine results for the eight demographic groups. Par-
ticipation is lower than in the full sample for Asians and women. Participation
is higher than the full sample for white male non-Hispanics, NativeAmericans,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.205 Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Drugs
sample. The regression coefficients are negative and significant for black,
Asian, Hispanic, and youth. Gender is positive and significant, indicating that
women consume less. Marital status is negative, indicating that married people
consume less. The Native American variable is insignificant three out of four
times. The Puerto Rican and Mexican variables are positive, indicating that
these groups consume more than other Hispanics. The price variable is nega-
tive and significant in six out of eight specifications (the exceptions are for
blacks and Asians). The own-price elasticities were estimated for the signifi-
cant variables and do not differ significantly, with the exception of Native
Americans, who have a much more elastic demand. The effects ofincome on
cocaine participation varies considerably by demographic group. Income has
a positive effect on participation for youth and Native Americans, a negative
effect on participation for blacks, and no effect on participation for the re-
maining groups.
Table 7.5 presents the heroin results for the eight demographic groups. Par-
ticipation is lower than in the full sample for women. Participation is higher
than the full sample for blacks, NativeAmericans, Hispanics, and youth. White
male non-Hispanics andAsians have about the same participation as in the full
sample. The regression coefficients are generally insignificant for all race and
ethnic categories. Gender is positive and significant, indicating that women
consume less. Marital status is negative, indicating that married people con-
sume less. The price variable is negative and significant in three out of eight
specifications; the three groups are the full sample, white male non-Hispanics,
and women. The own-price elasticities were estimated for the significant vari-
ables. The magnitude ofthe price effect was significantly larger for white male
non-Hispanics than for the full sample or women. Income has a significant
negative effect on participation only for the full sample and for women and
was insignificant for all other groups.
Table 7.6 presents only the cross-price effects from 96 additional regres-
sions. Each of the 32 regressions in tables 7.2 through 7.5 were reestimated
three times with the addition of one other drug price added to the specifica-
tion. 12 The results for each demographic group are presented in each column,
as in the other regression tables. The table contains a panel for each ofthe six
drug pairs. Most of the coefficients that indicate that there is a relationship
between the drug pairs are in the first three columns: the full sample, white
male non-Hispanics, and blacks. These three groups may have more significant
cross-price effects than the other groups because these groups are both large
samples and contain larger percentages of users. Table 7.6 suggests comple-
mentarity ofalcohol and marijuana, complementarity of alcohol and cocaine,
complementarity of alcohol and heroin, and complementarity of cocaine and
marijuana. The relationship between alcohol and marijuana shows that mari-
12. Only the cross-price effects are presented in table 7.6 since the full set of results would





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.210 Henry SatTer and FrankJ. Chaloupka
juana use is responsive to alcohol prices but that decriminalization has no ef-
fect on alcohol use.
7.5 Conclusions
Some consistent and inconsistent patterns emerge across drug categories.
The demographic use patterns for alcohol and marijuana are similar, while
cocaine and heroin each have distinct demographic patterns. For alcohol and
marijuana, the evidence shows that all included groups consume less ofthese
substances, except for white male non-Hispanics, who consume more. ForNa-
tiveAmericans and youth, the pattern ofparticipation and use differ. ForNative
Americans that consume alcohol, their consumption is higher than the full
sample. Marijuana participation for youth is higher than in the full sample, but
for those who participate, their use is lower than the full sample. For cocaine,
women and Asians consume less, but the other included demographic groups
consume more than average. For heroin, the simple means show that blacks,
Native Americans, Hispanics, and youth consume more than average. How-
ever, when other things are held constant, these groups consume the same
amount as the relevant omitted demographic categories.
The results also show a generally consistent pattern ofnegative price effects
for all drugs and all demographic groups. The own-price elasticities are similar
by demographic category. This suggests thatprice-orientedpolicies have a sim-
ilar effect on each of the included demographic groups. The results also pro-
vide evidence that alcohol and illicit drugs are complements. This suggests
that policies that increase alcohol prices also reduce drug abuse. Similarly, pol-
icies that increase drug prices reduce alcohol abuse.
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